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This short paper is a note offering provisional results of my current research in
philosophical economics and the philosophy of economics. It is offered in the
spirit of promoting discussion of an interesting topic worthy of further
investigation.
Now: If you google the title of this research note, you will certainly find some
interesting things. The thing that you will find recurring most often is
management guru Tom Peters’s claim … that there are no such things as
commodities. [1] What Peters means by this claim is that every product is
(allegedly) infinitely differentiable. There are no plain old commodities: there
are only sophisticated shiny personalisable products. Taxi-rides, and even wheat
and ball-bearings: all are individual, or individualisable, according to Peters
and his many protégés.
I am sceptical of Peters’s claim, but I will not debate it here as such. It is not my
topic; although it would be true to say that my take on my topic points generally
in the opposite direction from his management-speak and certainly from his
market-utopianism (and I will return to this point briefly later in this paper).
My claim here is that there are no such things as ‘commodities’… in the
following sense: I will argue that all ‘commodities’ are constructed entirely out
of fictitious commodities. Or, perhaps more perspicuously and parsimoniously:
that all putative ‘commodities’ are actually fictions/fictitious.
And that something made entirely out of fictitious commodities cannot in the
final analysis be intelligibly regarded as a commodity, at all.Rupert Read 94
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Polanyi on commodities Polanyi on commodities Polanyi on commodities Polanyi on commodities Polanyi on commodities
My claim is an extension of (perhaps, a drawing out of the tacit implications of)
a famous claim made by Karl Polanyi in The great transformation (1944). So I
first need to draw out what Polanyi argued, in this connection.
Here is Fred Block’s exposition, in his Introduction in Polanyi’s text, of the
central points of Polanyi’s argument (xxv-xxvi):
“Polanyi argues that creating a fully self-regulating market economy requires that
human beings and the natural environment be turned into pure commodities, which
assures the destruction of both society and the natural environment. // …The logic
underlying this argument rests on Polanyi’s distinction between real and fictitious
commodities. For Polanyi the definition of a commodity is something that has been
produced for sale on a market. By this definition land, labour and money are
fictitious commodities because they were not originally produced for sale on a
market. Labour is simply the activity of human beings, [2] land is subdivided
nature, and the supply of money and credit in modern societies is necessarily shaped
by government policies. Modern economics starts by pretending that these fictitious
commodities will behave in the same way as real commodities, but Polanyi insists
that this sleight of hand has fatal consequences. It means that economic theorising
is based on a lie, and this lie places human society at risk. // …In the case of
manufactured commodities, a falling price for an abundant commodity restores
equilibrium by both encouraging increased consumption and by discouraging new
production. In the case of fictitious commodities, the effectiveness of the price
mechanism is reduced because automatic increases or decreases in supply cannot be
assumed.”
Polanyi argues that “A market economy can exist only in a market society” (74),
for manufacturers must be able to purchase land and labour and have access to
credit on market terms, if they are to be able to respond to fluctuations in supply
and demand with any rapidity. Here is how Polanyi himself puts the heart of
the matter (74-5):
“A market economy must comprise all elements of industry, including land, labour
and money… But labour and land are no other than the human beings themselves of
which every society consists and the natural surroundings in which it exists. To
include them in the market mechanism means to subordinate the substance of society
itself to the laws of the market. // The crucial point is this: labour, land and money
are essential elements of industry; they…must be organised in markets; in fact, these
markets form an absolutely vital part of the economic system. But labour, land andThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 95
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money are obviously not commodities; the postulate that anything that is bought and
sold must have been produced for sale is emphatically untrue in regard to them. In
other words, according to the empirical definition of a commodity they are not
commodities.”
This line of thinking seems to me clearly sound; I will in any case at least for
the sake of argument assume it in what follows.
Let us first take the case of money. I will handle this important case somewhat
briefly, because I have dealt with it at length elsewhere. [3] But I would
certainly argue that part of the real route to a permanent (i.e. indefinitely
sustainable) culture (a ‘permaculture’) is through the politics (or the re-
politicisation) of money. By ‘the politicization of money’, I’m not just talking
about reining in and regulating haute finance, but about democratizing the
issuance and creation of money itself. Money, apart from the limited amount
issued through the seigniourage of states, is almost entirely created by a small
segment of private individuals/corporations (bankers). [4] They create needed
liquidity through debt, and ostensibly collect an income for this social service
through interest. But these private issuers of money don’t only benefit through
the payment to them of interest on money that they to a considerable extent
create digitally, out of thin air: for they also determine the incentive structures
of ‘viable’ social production.
We can and must re-social-ise the issuance of money in a way that enhances
equality and sustainability.
I will also note here that the worldwide financial crisis of 2007 onward is of
course a massive confirmation of Polanyi’s ideas. Politicians and the financial
‘industry’ [5] itself came to treat money more and more as if were just one more
commodity, as they produced more and more exotic financial ‘products’, in the
years leading up to the crisis. We have learnt from bitter experience since 2007
that, unless that ‘industry’ is leashed, it will wreak havoc first with money and
then (as a consequence) with the broader economy and society. In order for the
economy proper to prosper, finance must be tightly socially-regulated. [6] Money
is a fictitious commodity, and, unless handled right, it will bring trade in ‘real’
commodities – in products — crashing down. ‘Securitisation’ was a misnomer: it
bought/brought the holders of those ‘securities’ in particular and the members of
the economy in general no security. [7]Rupert Read 96
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My case here concerns primarily land and labour. Polanyi holds that these
fictitious commodities enable the production of real commodities, and that only
with regard to the latter can marketisation properly and relatively
unhazardously be undertaken. But Polanyi was writing at a time when social
and ecological limits to growth were far off in the distance, virtually
unthought-of. The question we have to ask now is whether it is possible any
longer to separate analytically the fictitious commodities from another alleged
class of ‘real’ commodities.
For what are ‘real’ commodities anyway, except combinations of land and
labour? This is my challenge to Polanyi, and my extension of his logic beyond
where he took it to: How can we understand manufactured products or anything
else that we buy and sell to be commodities, when they consist entirely of things
“not produced for sale”?
Commodities – ‘goods’ – ARE land (admixed with labour). The idea of a (real)
commodity is itself a fiction, an utterly-never-at-all-realised ‘ideal (sic.) type’.
Commodities do not escape their origins. They are the Earth. All that we ever do
is transform parts of the Earth, temporarily.
Am I saying that a thing is its origins? No. Indeed, I am of course not denying that
something changes when something is “produced” for sale. Indeed: that – such a
change – is precisely what labour accomplishes. But what I am insisting on is that
there is a grave danger of terms such as “produce” systematically misleading us,
into thinking that somehow we have escaped the constraints — the utterly-
inevitable ecological constraints — of our situation. This danger is a metaphysical
danger. We too easily fall into a fantasy that denies the fundamental sense in
which we never produce anything, but only re-sort and re-form the stuff of Earth
in ways that enable us, temporarily, to resist entropic drift. [8] We harness low-
entropy energy and materials, and utilise them for our purposes.
What we need to do is to do so in a way that actually can be sustained, long-
term, and that is not degrading to us or to others. But the idea that what these
parts of the Earth are really are items “produced (sic.) for sale” gets in the way of
that. So long as we forget that the Earth (and hard work) is what made all this
possible, and get caught up in the logic of alleged ‘production’ (and its unholy
twin, ‘consumption’), then placing the logic of sustainability centrally will beThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 97
Read, Rupert (2011) ‘There are no such things as ‘commodities’: a research note’,
The Journal of Philosophical Economics, IV:2, 93-104
impossible. For, again: there is a crucial sense in which we never really produce
anything, and indeed never really consume anything (except low-entropy
energy), either. We simply alter the form of the Earth, and of ourselves.
So that is my claim. Once we start to see clearly, we start to see that the economy
is a sub-set of the broader planetary eco-system, rather than the other way
around. This is the elementary founding claim of Ecological Economics, a
revolution as profound and as simple as – and directly parallel to -- that which
Copernicus affected when he displaced us from the centre of the universe. In
parallel, for Ecological Economics displaces human wants from the centre of the
economy, and places centrally the ecosystem – the source ultimately of all
wealth — instead. (For further explication, see e.g. the work of Herman Daly,
especially his For the common good.) [9]
One way of seeing this is to see that we ought to abandon the very category of
‘commodity’, except to signify something phantastical, something that we
imagine but that there is no such thing as really handling, trading, producing,
or consuming. There is nothing that is truly produced for sale. (In other words:
what I am offering here is a new way of introducing (explaining, justifying) the
fundamental paradigmatic claims of Ecological Economics.)
Even calling mine a ‘claim’ is odd, really. It is nothing more than the most
trivial truth, that I am reminding you of, the most elementary true common-
sense. [10] How could we manage to miss that all of our products are the
products of hard work and of the Earth itself? Only under the influence of a
powerful and invisible ideology.
In sum then: we need to remind ourselves of the phantastical quality of all
commodities, and the need to remind ourselves of this fiction (if we are to move
toward a permaculture) is pressing. It presses especially because of the
instrumentalism of this fiction. The fiction, that is, conceals exploitative
power relations (exploitative of Earth and of labour), and instrumentalises both
the Earth and other people.
Putting commoditization into reverse Putting commoditization into reverse Putting commoditization into reverse Putting commoditization into reverse Putting commoditization into reverse
To return to where we began, with Tom Peters’s claim that there are no such
things as commodities, only infinitely differentiated or differentiable products.Rupert Read 98
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It can now perhaps be seen more clearly how there is a sense in which I am
diametrically opposed to Peters’s claim. For, for Peters, the ultimate goal of
capitalism is in effect for everything to be turned into a commodity. Most
strikingly, not just the Earth, but people: the example that Peters uses most
often of a ‘commodity’ become a product is that of a taxi-driver who turns every
ride into a specifically-memorable experience. Nothing wrong with that, in
terms of improving quality of life for the driver and his passengers; but as Peters
tells the story, it is a story of the taxi-driver turning his rides into a more
outstanding consumer product. Which means, in effect: turning himself into a
consumer product, at least insofar as his labour power / his working-time is
much of his life. Peters might just as well have – even better have — used the
example of a particularly-effective prostitute… only, this would hardly have
made the point he wanted to make positively and uncontroversially. In short:
Peters’s idea is of the fictitious commodities becoming through and through
products. Zygmunt Bauman has argued recently that this is indeed the ultimate
logic of late capitalism, the hidden secret of our ‘consumer’ society: that we are
all more or less willingly turning ourselves into consumables. [11] As social
safety nets are targeted or crumble, we more and more are thrown onto the mass
market, needing as the catchphrase has it to sell ourselves, to earn a crust.
Furthermore, contemporary hyper-consumerist capitalism even sells us the
fantasy that we can directly purchase the things that we normally purchase
certain goods in order to (hope to) attain: namely, emotions, feelings. Tourist-
trips, music, greeting cards, and of course drugs: these are sold as if what is for
sale, what has been commodified, are moods and emotions themselves. This
absurd and in fact obscene idea, that emotions themselves are commodities,
discloses the danger inherent to the expanding logic of the commodity. It
indicates another aspect of the necessary work of the philosophical economist: To
generate a new critique of capitalism, by reminding citizens of the madness of
the idea of emotions-as-commodities. Our culture itself needs a radical ‘therapy’,
such that such an idea comes indeed to appear as mad, and not as logical.
Once we start to see through the true commodity fetish – namely, the fantasy
that there can be any such thing as a non-fictitious commodity – then we may be
able to transform our world for the better. The great transformation that we
require is one of resistance to the commoditization of life and Earth and
ourselves and our hearts, resistance for instance to the very idea of ‘natural
resources’ [12] (an idea which figures the world as one gigantic mine (andThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 99
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dumping ground)). The idea of commoditization has to be stood on its head. We
need to commoditize less and less of life, not more and more of it. It is possible
that the late capitalist project of commodifying people themselves, and of
commodifying even the emotions, is a fatal over-reach: maybe it can be used to
help to expose just how dubious the general logic of commodification is, and just
how far back it can be pushed. All the way back, in fact, I have argued. Rather
than everything becoming commodified or at least commodifiable, we ought – I
have argued – to hold that nothing truly can be.
Thus I reject both ‘incomplete commodification’ and ‘market
compartmentalization’ as strategies to address the drive towards commodification
that is profoundly present in capitalism [13]; neither strategy is nearly
sufficiently radical. If we prevent the complete commodification of certain
things (sex, body parts, etc.), then we are doing some good; but that is no more
than a holding operation. If we merely compartmentalize some things off from
the market, then we punish those people more or less forced into commodifying
those things, and we do not address the underlying drive towards
commodification. As Joel Kovel (2007) argues, we must put commodification
into reverse. We must sell less and less of the Earth for money; we must sell
ourselves and buy and sell other people and aspire to purchase feelings and
emotions less and not more, and we must move from a capital-centred economy to
an economy which is smaller and which is centred on co-operation and zero-
waste (and which not only defends existing commonses but creates new
commonses). Polanyi’s ‘fictitious commodities’ approach is, in itself, only a
strong version of market-compartmentalization. We need to go further: if we
start to understand that there are nothing but fictitious commodities, then we
can start to move beyond market-compartmentalization altogether, and put
commoditization into reverse.
Conclusion: Putting the ‘commodity’ concept Conclusion: Putting the ‘commodity’ concept Conclusion: Putting the ‘commodity’ concept Conclusion: Putting the ‘commodity’ concept Conclusion: Putting the ‘commodity’ concept
radically into question radically into question radically into question radically into question radically into question
The term “commodity” derives etymologically from the term “commodious”,
meaning basically good, useful, convenient, pleasant. It has been horribly abused
by classical and neoclassical economics, which turned a ‘commodity’ from being
something that is good into meaning simply: something that is saleable,
something that is or can be treated as if it is produced for sale. Unless, of course,Rupert Read 100
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what it is for something to be good simply is for it to be saleable (If it is bought,
then its buyer must judge it to be good – a supreme ‘vindication’ of Homo
Economicus and of preference-based positivism in economics…). [14] What
“commodity” originally meant was: good. What it has come to mean now, by
contrast, is such that we must work for there to be less and less of it – of them –
in existence, if we and our descendants are to have a good life, for an
indefinitely long future to come…
This historical turn has involved of course a betrayal of the founding insights of
Adam Smith, who is wrongly used nowadays as a poster-boy for deregulation and
for rampant marketisation. This point is stressed by Greens such as Lucas and
Woodin (2004) and Porritt (2005): what is commodious, what pertains to and
advances the common good, simply is what economics as the practice of the
theory of moral sentiments ought to promote.
For: There is no prospect of an ecologically-survivable future, let alone a decent
future, unless we start to make this great transformation – away from the
concept of the commodity — a reality. The needs of our time are plain. And thus
Polanyi offers us some hope – for the transformations that he described were
necessary responses to the crises of their times. We need to make the
transformation that is necessary for our time. It begins with the recognition
urged here: that we have been – literally — labouring under an ideological
delusion, in thinking of commodities as real things. Actually, they are only real
insofar as and so long as we continue to labour under that delusion. As soon as
we start to see that the concept of a commodity is tacitly a tool to keep us from
recognising our humanity and the centrality to our lives and our economy of the
Earth (rather than of individual preferences and the inegalitarian system we use
to satisfy (some of) them), then we inevitably start to act so as to change the
system, and the ideology that has held us captive not only becomes visible, but
instantaneously starts to dissolve, too. The commodity melts into air…
 That is as far as I am going, here, in this research note. I have not sought here
to set out the philosophical transformation — the revolution —, involved in the
shift to the new paradigm of ecological economics, letalone to advance ecological
economics in detail. (In relation to those tasks, the reader can already consult
the books and articles of Herman Daly, John Cobb Jr., etc.) My exercise rather
has been one of ground-clearing, and of finding a philosophical and rhetorical
means of making plausible the founding conception of ecological economics. AThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 101
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new way of thinking of land and labour, of Earth and its people. And thus of
radically putting into question the commodity-concept.
We would do better, indeed, to say that (in the sense laid out above) there aren’t
really any such things as commodities.
It may seem hard to envision what it would be like to think beyond the very idea
of commodities. And the building-down of our commoditized life-world will in
any case of course not happen overnight. But I think we can start to get an idea
of what it would be like, if we think of genuinely living lightly on the Earth, in
co-operative communities. If we replace in thought the monetized and
commoditised world of agribusiness with an existence founded on the principles
of ‘permaculture’, a zero-waste food-production system. In the long run, energy
and materials that we use will have to be fully renewable, and equitably shared.
We will be one more animal, co-constituting an ecosystem. But we will be the
thoughtful animal. The animal that has successfully thought beyond the
concepts and practices that (at present) threaten its own future: concepts such as
‘commodity’.
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Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes
[1] See for instance http://www.aipmm.com/html/newsletter/archives/000169.php
[accessed May 17 2010]
[2] For argument as to why we ought to take labour as indeed a category
understood to refer to all productive human activity, see my (2002).
[3] I discuss this case in some detail for instance, in my (2009) (and also in my
Wittgenstein among the human sciences, forthcoming with Ashgate, and also in
my The end of liberalism and the dawn of a permanent culture, forthcoming). I
suggest there that we are easily duped by a ‘natural’ view of money as a ‘socially
neutral’ store of value, and that we fail to see money’s nature as a call upon orRupert Read 102
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taking of the labour-time of others, and as a standing threat to ecology.
(Because the money-store is something that can be ‘cashed in’ as a call upon or a
taking from the Earth). Money is the weirdest of social constructions, yet one we
seldom pay reflective attention to.
[4] For justification of this claim, see the “Afterword” to Daly and Cobb (1989).
The need endlessly to produce a return on money and interest borrowed
(especially on debt-based money) tends, they suggest, to distort society’s interests
toward the unsustainable practices. (As of course does the imperative upon
corporations to maximise profits.)
[5] My use of scare-quotes here is deliberate. There is surely something troubling
about the extension of the term ‘industry’ beyond areas of activity where
something is actually produced to apply instead to areas of the economy which
are essentially parasitic upon actual productive industry. For justification of the
factual claim that most banking activity is parasitic upon the real economy, and
destroys value rather than creating it, see this report from the New Economics
Foundation ( http://www.neweconomics.org/publications/bit-rich) [accessed
Feb.10 2011].
[6] For further argument to this conclusion, see my www.business-spotlight.de/
news/head-to-head/should-the-government-nationalize-all-banks [accessed Jan.
10 2011]
[7] In a longer work to come, of which this research-note is a ‘fragment’, I
question the concepts of ‘natural capital’, ‘natural resources’, ‘human capital’,
‘human resources’, and ‘social capital’. By now, my basis for so doing should be
relatively obvious. These concepts involve modelling land and labour – the Earth
and people – as if they were only: kinds of resources for economic activity,
essentially saleable, monetizable. In other words, these concepts inevitably figure
fictitious commodities as if they were simply: commodities.
[8] For a detailed explication, see Sayre’s (2010).
[9] Polanyi himself already made some steps in this direction of course. His book
analyses and describes the remarkable transformation by means of which “the
control of the economic system” is turned over to markets, a transformation that
“is of overwhelming consequence to the whole organisation of society: it means
no less than the running of society as an adjunct to the market. Instead ofThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 103
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economy being embeddeded in social relations, social relations are embedded in
the economic system.” (The Great Transformation, p.xxiv) Given Polanyi’s own
stress on land as being a fictitious commodity, it takes only a little imagination
to take Polanyi’s point on to the impossible ‘achievement’ of the system of
modern economics: the embedding of the ecosystem too within the economic
system (as merely the location of sources and sinks, in standard economics; as
something itself to be monetized, in environmental economics (which is merely
standard economics with a few added bells and whistles – see my argument
against Robert Costanza’s project of monetizing nature, in my (2007)). It is the
reversal of that systemic madness which a genuinely green Ecological Economics
of course aspires to.
[10] So my essay in fact operates very much in the spirit of Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, which he said consisted only in assembling reminders
(of things that we tend to forget under the influence of confusions and
propaganda), not in asserting opinions or theories as if they were fact. See his
(1958), sections 127-9.
[11] See his (2007). Bauman takes Facebook to be one of many major symptoms
of this transformation.
[12] Compare Heidegger’s attack on the conceptualisation of more and more of
the world as a ‘standing reserve’ for human use.
[13] These terms are Margaret Jane Radin’s, from her thoughtful (1996) book,
Contested Commodities.
[14] In my “Are goods good?” (forthcoming), I extend this line of thinking to
argue that the appropriation of the term “good” to refer to consumer…goods (one
cannot even yet find another suitable word!) has been disastrous, and that
unpacking the disaster fundamentally undermines approaches such as John
Rawls’s with his ‘primary social goods’ (sic.).
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